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‘Big Think’, Disjointed Incrementalism:
Chinese Economic Success and Policy




Chinese economic success is not the product of free market accidental coin-
cidence. Rather, it is orchestrated by the State through a mixture of nation-
alism (‘big think’) and pragmatic decisions (disjointed incrementalism) in
agriculture, finance and industry. Furthermore, these decisions build upon
existing institutions (e.g. the Household Responsibility System, Township
Village Enterprises, etc), some dating back to pre-revolutionary China (e.g.
Special Economic Zones), rather than imported ones from outside China.
The article explores the utility (and lack thereof) of the Chinese model in
the African context, as well as the possibilities of an Africa-centred ‘big think’
(Pan-Africanism) capable of mobilizing the continent for development.
Résumé
L’essor de l’économie chinoise n’est pas le produit des miracles du marché
libre. Au contraire, il est l’oeuvre de l’Etat chinois à travers un mélange
heureux de nationalisme et d’une politique décisionnelle pragmatique portant
sur l’agriculture, les finances et l’industrie. En outre, cette politique
pragmatique est basée sur les institutions chinoises, comme, par exemple, le
Système de Responsibilité des Ménages, les Entreprises Villes-Villages et les
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Zones de Libre-Echange, au lieu d’être basée sur les institutions importées.
Cet article met en examen l’utilité du « modèle » chinois au contexte africain,
et explore les possibilités d’un nationalisme africain axé sur le Pan-Africanisme
comme moyen de mobiliser le continent pour le développement.
Introduction
When economic historians write the development record of the last dec-
ades of the twentieth century, they should have good cause for casting
China as the success story of that fin de siecle. From 1979 to 1997 Chi-
na’s annual GDP grew by an average of 10 percent, an accomplishment
matched (and surpassed) only by the former Soviet Union in the 1920s
and 1930s. Chinese industrial production in the late 1990s was seven
times larger than in 1978, and total trade fourteen times larger. Eco-
nomic growth in China has resulted in improved living standards: real
income per capita more than quadrupled between 1979 and 1997, thereby
lifting more than 200 million out of absolute poverty (World Bank 1997).
Chinese steel production increased by 50 percent between 2000 and
2004, evidence of a buoyant industrial sector ready to churn out durable
goods for the largest middle class in one country in history and for the
world economy (Avery 2005).
Historians are less likely to be excited about Africa’s economic per-
formance during the same period, and indeed since decolonization in
the 1960s. By every imaginable index of socio economic performance,
Africa has been moving backward rather than forward. The statistics are
telling, if not to say depressing: Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for just 1
percent of world industrial production, down from 4 percent in the 1960s.
It experienced virtually no economic growth in the last two decades of
the twentieth century, in spite of Structural Adjustments Programs
(SAPS), which were supposed to set Africa on a path of sustainable
development. Africa is home to more than half of the world’s poorest
countries. Naturally, the polarity in economic achievement between
China, the world’s fastest growing economy in recent years, and Africa,
its poorest continent, invites scrutiny, as well it should. This article makes
three points.
Firstly, Chinese economic success owes much to the state, which,
through a mixture of nationalism (‘big think’) and pragmatic decisions
(disjointed incrementalism) in specific policy areas, such as agriculture,
finance, trade and industry, has catapulted China to economic super-
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power status in less than 3 decades. It has done so not by absolute com-
mand and control of productive assets, but by centralizing macro-eco-
nomic and social policy making while devolving policy implementation
to regional and local officials of the Chinese Community Party, which of
course remains an organ of the national state. This allows centralized
authority to maintain control over the Chinese hinterland; the state can
bring to heel local officials who bring disrepute to Communist Party
rule, even while these same officials have been given wide latitude to
bring development to their area without diktat from Beijing. Thus, China
shows that centralization and decentralization are not mutually exclu-
sive, but can be apportioned according to policy area.
Secondly, the success of China’s developmental state1 is based on
innovations made on existing institutions – some predating the Chinese
Revolution – rather than the creation of new institutions. Chinese lead-
ers have proven to be particularly adroit at adapting social institutions
to their vision of reform. The Household Responsibility System (HRS)
and the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) are two examples of
institutional innovations, which have largely resolved agency and soft
budget constraint problems without privatization. China’s Special Eco-
nomic Zones (SEZs) show how capital-starved countries can attract capi-
tal through direct foreign investment (DFI), as well as how the latter can
contribute to the development of host economies. These SEZs were
established in areas (southern coastal China), which had served as Chi-
na’s window to the world economy in the second half of the nineteenth
century. Shut to capitalists during the Mao Zedong era, these former
trading outposts were reopened after 1979 and would become the in-
dustrial engines of China’s economy with capital pouring in at first from
overseas Chinese and later foreign investors.
Thirdly, certain aspects of the Chinese reform experience are of im-
port to Africa. For example, China’s centralization of development policy
making and decentralization of implementation is extremely insightful
for Africa, where one of the unfinished debates is the contention be-
tween nationalists, who favour a decentralized approach to economic
development, and Pan-Africanists, who advocate a regional approach
leading ultimately to continental economic development. China shows
that, under the right circumstances, the dichotomy may be largely spuri-
ous.2 Equally, an overarching ideology of ‘big think’ articulated by a strong
state committed to development but willing to engage in policy experi-
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mentation using sub-national officials and existing social institutions
are not incompatible. China further demonstrates that it is possible to
improve economic performance by substituting the incentives typically
associated with markets with others so as to affect the behaviour of
producers, consumers and investors (Taylor 2005).
The ‘shock therapy’ of neo-liberalism imposed by the West and its
institutions (the World Bank) in the 1980s and 1990s, with its panoply
of pro-market reforms (e.g. privatization, currency devaluation, trade lib-
eralization, government retrenchment, etc.) is not the only option for Af-
rica, and is quite possibly the wrong option. China, which has yet to make
firm guarantees to private property rights, defies contemporary economic
orthodoxy and may be all the better for it. Africa, which may have ap-
plied neo-liberalism’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) more rig-
orously than any other continent with little to show, can learn from
China’s nuanced approach to development, which uses state and mar-
ket, or, to use the idiom of administration, centralization and decentrali-
zation.
The article does not glorify China, whose development has not been
without costs. Chinese economic success has been regionally and so-
cially uneven, politically undemocratic and demographically inhumane.
Thus China’s one-child policy would never pass cultural muster in Af-
rica (which is not to say that population growth should not be control-
led; the question is how). It is true that, historically, economic
transformation has never been achieved without severe human costs,
but the latter must never be accepted as the inevitable price of progress.
Economic development in Africa will have to grapple with the issue of
equity; that is to say, instead of making some people rich first in the
hope that their wealth will eventually trickle down to others, Africa will
have to insure that the fruits of development are savoured by everyone,
perhaps not equally but certainly equitably. For a country that still calls
itself socialist, China tolerates a degree of socio-economic inequality
that Africans should find unacceptable.
In addition, China is facing an ecological crisis because of the pollu-
tion wrought by rapid and poorly regulated industrialization. Water pol-
lution alone is estimated to cost between 3.5 and 8 percent of GDP
(World Bank 2007). Given the fragility of Africa’s ecosystem, with one
third of its landmass already claimed by the Sahara desert, the continent
can ill afford additional ecological degradation as the price to pay for
industrialization. Whatever economic development occurs in Africa in
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the future has got to be environment-friendly; the natural abode is al-
ready too degraded in much of the continent to permit additional rav-
ages by industry. In sum, the article recognizes the limits of China’s
development, and whatever positive lessons provided by the Chinese
experience will have to be adjusted to the African condition (hence the
call at the end for Pan-Africanism).
The article is organized as follows. The next section recognizes the
methodological challenges of comparing China and Africa, while mak-
ing what the writer thinks is a strong case for this type of research. The
two sections after that discuss disjointed incrementalism and ‘big think’
in the Chinese context. As a policy instrument, disjointed incrementalism
builds upon existing institutions rather than create new ones; it also
dissipates some development decisions to subalterns, thereby facilitat-
ing policy experimentation. Alongside our focus on the application of
disjointed incrementalism in China, we look in Africa for institutions
upon which a similar approach to development policy might be built.
The last section of the article is an examination of what an African ver-
sion of ‘big think’ might look like, in the light of African reality.
Methodological Challenges
Any comparative analysis always runs the danger of examining phenom-
ena that are so fundamentally different as to make the enterprise a risky
endeavour. Where comparison between China and Africa is concerned,
this study recognizes these limiting factors.
Firstly, and most obviously, China is a nation-state while Africa is a
continent. This difference is very significant, inasmuch as one govern-
ment makes authoritative decisions in China, while in Africa 50 do so.
Hence, whatever the secrets to Chinese economic success, they may not
be so easily unravelled by African governments of differing administra-
tive capacities, ideologies and leaderships. Africa’s political atomization
also makes for more restricted movement of goods and people across
space, as well as systemic differences in such important determinants of
economic performance as natural resource endowment, law, money, se-
curity, human capital, etc.
Secondly, China and Africa do not have the same geography: one is
on the western end of the East-West axis while much of the other pivots
along the North-South axis. Differences in geographic location have
development consequences, not least in terms of the receptivity of econo-
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mies to technological innovation developed elsewhere, the compatibil-
ity of eco-systems (which facilitates the transplantation of new crops
and animal species) and ease of travel (Diamond 1997). Geography may
not be destiny but it is not a negligible quantity in economic history, or,
for that matter, history tout court. It was kind to China, most unkind to
Africa, in the late twentieth  century. Specifically, China was fortunate to
be surrendered by success stories from which it could learn and which
were also major investors in its economy (e.g. Japan and Taiwan). Afri-
can countries, by contrast, are beset by poverty in their neighbourhood.
Thirdly, it is possible that China’s success may be due to factors that
are unique to China, in which case it would be extremely difficult for any
aspiring developer to use the Chinese model to its advantage. In some
ways China has been the beneficiary of the self-fulfilling prophecy of
high achievement, which works approximately as follows. The world
expects China to be a great power and the largest market in one country
in history. Consequently, foreign investors flock to China in the hope of
establishing a presence before it is too late; they are even willing to incur
short-term financial losses and put up with institutional shortcomings,
often in return for little more than expectation of fabulous profit taking.
In part, because of this (irrational?) exuberance, China becomes the
success everyone predicted it would be, because it is the recipient of
much needed direct foreign investment (DFI). No such expectation, of
course, pertains to Africa, which lacks China’s demographic clout (e.g.
22 percent of the world’s population); as a result, investors stay away,
the continent is starved for capital, and its development remains mired in
the rut.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, there are strong
arguments in support of the kind of comparative analysis undertaken in
this article. China and Africa are (still) in the same geo-political and
economic imaginary known as the Third World, whose existence as a
theoretical construct scholars continue to accept, in spite of the fact that
it is not a monolith. Officially, China’s per capita Gross National In-
come or GNI ($2,010 in 2006 dollars) is much closer to (sub-Saharan)
Africa’s per capita GNI ($1,418) than it is to that of the developed world,
as represented in the OEDC countries ($40,248) (International Finance
Corporation n.d.). Thus, we are not talking about entities that are, in
aggregate macroeconomic terms, in vastly different universes, which would
therefore preclude useful comparison.
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Further, it has long been a tenet in the social sciences that economic
development, for good and ill, has ‘demonstration effects’. Most of the
great academic debates since World War II, from modernization theory
to dependency theory, from neo-liberalism to post-modernism, have been
underwritten by the exportability and desirability of this or that eco-
nomic model. World policy makers have also erred in a similar direction
by their actions. Indeed, the architecture of international relations since
1948, with its multilateral institutions strewn across the globe, reflects a
profound belief in the transmutation of economic development and, on
a less flattering note, a hubris in western capacity to bring it to the ‘rest’.
The Cold War was in part about how many countries in the periphery or
Third World would adopt economic systems and ideologies developed
in more advanced countries.
In brief, the kind of metastasized analysis expounded in this article is
not the first, although this type of research is increasingly (and unfortu-
nately) rare (for reasons discussed later). Metaphorically speaking, the
aim of this paper is to find out the proverbial Chinese menu entrées that
may have their equivalents in the African gastronomy. More concretely,
it is not suggested that Africa should adopt – lock, stock and barrel – the
Chinese ‘model,’ but this paper is interested in extracting from the Chi-
nese experience broad lessons and principles, which, when adapted to
the African milieu, may yield similar results. It is equally interested in
investigating the pitfalls of economic development in China so they may
be avoided in Africa, as well as examining where Africa may have gone
wrong while China has not.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, there has been a profound gap
in the social studies since at least the 1960s, when so-called experts
invaded the academic scene. The net result has been not only the artifi-
cial separation of disciplines that should be natural allies (e.g. econom-
ics and political science; sociology and anthropology; geography and area
studies, etc.), but their sequestration to enemy camps that increasingly
engage in intestinal fights over dwindling resources, prestige and turf
protection. In this environment of hyper-specialization, where a
simulacrum of seemingly value-free data is conflated with true scientific
objectivity, newly minted PhDs know a great deal about the limited ar-
eas in which they are trained, including the methods and mathematical
models which they are told are so indispensable to ‘scientific’ work, and
precious little about everything else. Worse, their training has desensi-
tized them to thinking outside of the box. This is a real disservice in a
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world where distance is literally being shrunk by communications and
transportation technologies, not to mention the oft-stated phenomenon
of globalization. In this world, China cannot be ignored. Its weight in
the geo-political balance and rapid ascendance in the global economy
militates against such an exclusion. Nor can Africa, arguably the world’s
richest continent in terms of natural resources and, perhaps because of
this, the key to future prosperity, be sidelined. There are, therefore, strong
reasons to study China and Africa in tandem rather than isolation.
This article brings together these two seemingly inchoate areas of the
world economy, which, judging by their recent performance and growing
ties, are as polar opposites as they are complementary. It has the further
merit of attempting to bridge the gap between two spheres of inquiry
(Sinotology and African Studies) that the intellectual ghettoization spo-
ken of earlier has tended to widen. It is a ‘thought’ piece meant to resus-
citate what has become a lost art – i.e. the examination of big ideas and
challenges, using large units of analysis – as well as provoke debate among
Africanists and Chinese specialists.
The author had the privilege of starting academic life as an Africanist,
but serendipitously ‘stumbled’ upon China in the early 2000s, coinci-
dentally the period during which China’s economic engagement in Af-
rica appears to have intensified, as its own economy went into overdrive.
The net result has been the fusion of interest in these two areas and the
production of a series of articles (published in both places), of which
this one is the latest instalment. The method employed in this article is
that of the participant-observer; the data are overwhelmingly secondary,
with ‘primary data’ consisting of structured interviews and informal con-
versation with Chinese colleagues at the headquarters of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the Institute of West Asian and
African Studies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – all in Beijing.
The Chinese Way
China’s approach to economic development is based neither on laissez
faire nor command principles. The first suggests a political economy in
which market forces totally dictate resource allocation, with government
relegated to providing basic public goods including security. The second
connotes the obliteration of markets and their total replacement by the
state, which owns all productive assets and makes production decisions
based (ostensibly) on social needs rather than profit making.
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Chinese attempt at economic development since 1979 belies the
aforementioned extremes. Many of China’s reforms run counter to the
tenets of neo-liberalism. At the same time, China has clearly moved
away from a command economy, which historically has had these charac-
teristics: central planning, collectivized agriculture, state control of in-
dustrial assets, an egalitarian ethos, etc. Chinese economic policy is largely
non-socialist, even though Chinese officials in the Deng era occasion-
ally give a wink and a nod to socialism (always with the qualifier: ‘with
Chinese characteristics’ under Deng). It is very revealing that President
Hu Jintao’s imprint on Chinese ideology is called ‘scientific develop-
ment’, as opposed to ‘socialist development’ or ‘scientific socialism’, as
would have been the case under Mao Zedong. The current leadership in
China has virtually expunged the word socialism from everyday discourse,
and, more importantly, policy.
Instead, China has followed in the footsteps of other Asian develop-
mental states, such as Japan and South Korea. In these countries, as well
as Malaysia and Singapore, states ‘intervene actively in the economy in
order to guide or promote particular substantive goals e.g. full employ-
ment, export competitiveness, energy self-sufficiency’ (Chan 1990) but
do not own the means of production outright. There is more state own-
ership in China, because of its history of a command economy, but it is
moving toward a mixed system, in which the state’s role is akin to that
of an orchestra conductor rather than one of its players. The so-called
China way would seem to confirm the ‘demonstration effects’ thesis.
Chinese economic reforms have proceeded in broad stages, reflecting
the inherent caution of incremental policy making, as well as the reality
of sharp differences inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) be-
tween liberals (i.e., those who favoured market reforms) and conserva-
tives (i.e., those who favoured state control through central planning).
Thus the Chinese approach to economic development has not followed
a straight, linear and unimpeded course. Rather, the path has been lit-
tered with obstructions, which the Chinese leadership has managed to
overcome but not without making tactical concessions along the way.
Chinese economic policy making has been described as ‘crossing the
river by feeling for stones’, meaning making adjustments to policy as
circumstances warrant. A preferable description would be disjointed
incrementalism.
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Disjointed incrementalism is a complex form of strategic analysis,
which is based on Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality. It en-
tails focusing on policy choices that differ incrementally from existing
policies; using a relatively small number of policy alternatives (usually
not more than three or four); evaluating policies on the basis of ‘impor-
tant’ consequences, rather than the entire universe of possible conse-
quences; countless end-means and means-end adjustments through trials
and errors; and finding solutions that are ‘good enough’ to ameliorate
current problems (Etzioni 1967). Karl Popper (1961) had perhaps the
best definition of disjointed incrementalism, which he termed piecemeal
social engineering. ‘The piecemeal engineer will avoid undertaking re-
forms of a complexity and scope which make it impossible for him to
disentangle causes and effects, and to know what he is really doing’
(Popper 2002).
As a decision making type, incrementalism has been accused of con-
servatism, and, according to critics, there are circumstances in which bold
actions, or synoptic decisions, are necessary. In addition, even incremen-
tal decisions need theory (Gordon and Waldner 1979). Incrementalism
need be neither conservative in outcome nor indifferent to theory, or a
larger picture. Modest steps, if taken often enough, can have important
cumulative effects ushering in significant change. Furthermore, modest
steps can take place against the larger backdrop of a foot race, hence the
proverb about the 1,000-mile journey, or de la Fontaine’s fable of the
tortoise and the hare. On the other hand, major decisions made infre-
quently and erratically may give the illusion of change while maintaining
the status quo. They can also be made by decision makers, who eschew
theory and act purely on whims.
China’s disjointed incrementalism has taken place in the larger con-
text of ‘theory’ or ‘big think’, thus disputing critiques of the incremental
model. Generically, ‘big think’ refers to attempts by a political commu-
nity to rally its members around goals and objectives, whose achieve-
ment will ostensibly lead to collective welfare (typically defined in terms
of security, stability and prosperity, or the goals of statecraft). In the
modern age, where political communities are organized into nation-states,
‘big think’ is a euphemism for nationalism, the expression of which is
conditioned by a variety of factors, including the history of the political
community (e.g. how it experienced colonialism), the ideology of state
elites and how they came to power (through violent revolution or some
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type of negotiated transition) and the extent of the political communi-
ty’s integration into the international system.
In the case of China, ‘big think’ implies a conception of the country
as a great power, probably from the very beginning. Thus, in ancient
times China was the Central Kingdom (Zhon Guo), which presumably
entails a political community whose pre-eminence surpassed all others.3
In the 19th century, even when parts of China were conquered by impe-
rialist powers and centralized authority in Beijing was extremely weak,
this ethos persisted. In the early 1960s, disagreement between China
and the former Soviet Union had more to do with Chinese nationalism
than communist ideological differences. In the latest incarnation of Chi-
nese ‘big think’, the state has ensconced development in improving eco-
nomic performance, in order to maintain autonomy at home
(self-reliance), project power and influence abroad, legitimize Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rule and oversee China’s ‘peaceful rise’ (to
superpower status).
In sum, ‘big think’ in contemporary China is an ideology conceived
by the state to sell the legitimacy of its control by the Chinese Commu-
nist Party, based on the latter’s management of the economy, its ability
to defend China against the historical humiliation of foreign occupa-
tions and the (re)unification of the Chinese mainland with prodigal ter-
ritories such as Taiwan. Chinese ‘big think’ interprets the past, justifies
the present and promises an even better future, but only if China re-
mains united and under the leadership of the CCP. Simply put, ‘big
think’ is ‘classic’ nationalism with a strong component of economic de-
velopment as a means of preserving the social and territorial integrity of
the Chinese community through the state.
The ‘uniqueness’ of China, even in comparison to Asian developers
such as Japan and South Korea, is that in the past nationalism was often
used as a justification for centralizing state power and pursuing eco-
nomic development based on dirigiste principles. Chinese nationalism
has accommodated administrative decentralization without political lib-
eralization in the pursuit of a mixed economy. It has devolved consider-
able power to sub-national officials in a unitary, one-party state, who
have infused competition in the economy but not in governing. What
has made this coexistence possible is the legitimacy of the institutions
of decentralization, which are examined next, respectively in agriculture,
industry, finance and foreign investment.
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Disjointed Incrementalism in Action
Agriculture
China has pursued land reform based on the so-called household re-
sponsibility system, which is tantamount to the state granting de facto
private property rights through a long term lease of land while it retains
de jure ownership. The lessee obtains user rights, which can be used to
secure income, transfer or sell the leased land, although in the latter two
cases transactions take the form of subletting. The state exacts various
kinds of dues on lessees, which in effect become fixed property taxes
(Chan 1990). The household responsibility system (henceforth HRS)
infuses private incentives in Chinese agriculture, even while the state
maintains property rights over land, which, in theory, gives it significant
power in the rural economy. It can allocate land use rights based on
criteria set by the Chinese government, raise land rent and taxes and
even alienate land from agriculture and channel it toward other pur-
poses (the Three Gorges Dam is a case in point).
The HRS has been introduced in China at least four times since the
revolution. On every occasion, it was implemented on a limited basis,
where it was tested before being expanded (again, further evidence of
disjointed incrementalism). China allowed the so-called two-land sys-
tem in Pingdu province, where plots were divided between those de-
voted to growing food for household consumption (kouliang tian) and
those reserved for commercial farming (chenbiao tian). In the first equity
was the driving principle for distribution, in the second efficiency was
the overriding value. Farmers who had the inclination and ability were
allocated larger parcels for commercial farming (which meant contract
farming with the government). In Shunyi, collective farms (re)emerged
in the 1980s. They were facilitated by their location in areas of high
rural industrialization, as well near major cities with sound infrastruc-
ture where mass-produced agricultural commodities could be taken
quickly to market. In Nanhai, farmers became land ‘shareholders’. They
could turn land use rights into land shares. In this way, individual plots
could be amalgamated into bigger ones cultivated by farming teams.
Individual farmers, now ‘shareholders’, received their benefits in the form
of dividends. In this way, too, farmers did not have to give up their land
use rights when they sought employment outside of the farming sector.
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In other words, land reform in China was sensitive to local specificity,
which gave the policy legitimacy and locals a stake in its success. China
did not have a one-size-fits-all approach to agricultural reform, which
might have been resisted, such as privatization or its antidote (collec-
tivization), although the guiding philosophy embedded in the HRS was
the same: providing farmers with the incentives to produce more, main-
taining at least nominal state control over land, and creating synergy
between agricultural production and industrialization (through the Town-
ship and Village Enterprise, discussed below).
More recently, China has invested massively in the agricultural sec-
tor. Agricultural lending more than doubled between 2000 and 2005,
rising from 60 billion to 145 billion USD. In mid-2005 this represented
6.5 percent of all loans (Gale and Collender 2006). Given China’s need
for capital elsewhere, e.g. manufacturing, housing, energy and infrastruc-
ture, this substantial injection of capital in agriculture may seem surpris-
ing. But ‘Chinese policymakers hold the view…that rural poverty can be
solved by an infusion of cheap credit and they are attempting to reverse
the historic outflow of funds from rural savers to urban borrowers’ (ibid).
In addition to boosting rural income, agricultural lending is aimed at
increasing grain production, a priority of Chinese policymakers, who fear
that importing large quantities of grain could negatively affect China’s
balance of trade and undermine the country’s effort to achieve food
self-sufficiency. The state’s entrance in the agricultural sector as a pro-
vider of credit but not as a direct and active landowner underscores,
once again, the fusion of centralization and decentralization, the mar-
riage between ‘big think’ (exemplified in this case in the desire to make
China self-sufficient in staple food) and disjointed incrementalism (the
idea that farmers in China should ultimately be able to enjoy the fruit
of their labour, and that farming activities should be based on local
conditions).
What does China’s approach to agriculture portend for Africa? Rural
China and Africa are, in at least one important respect, similar. When
one buys land in Ghana, for example, one enters, technically speaking,
into a long-term leasing agreement with a traditional chief, who holds
the land in trust on behalf of ‘his’ subjects and who should share the
proceeds of the lease with them. Except for southern Africa, whose agri-
culture underwent significant capitalist transformation in the late nine-
teenth century, land is communally owned in much of Africa as it was
(is) in China, with traditional authorities serving as fiduciaries. This
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pattern of ownership does not necessarily create a ‘tragedy of the com-
mons’, or severely impede economic performance. Famine does not seem
to have been a frequent occurrence in pre-colonial Africa, although this
may have been due to population growth rates that either remained stag-
nant or declined (in some cases, clearly because of the transatlantic slave
trade). It did become a major problem during colonialism, when land
was appropriated on a massive scale to create the large industrial farms
(palm oil in Cameroon and Nigeria, rubber in Liberia and, especially,
cotton in Lusophone Africa).
While land was (is) held by traditional authority on behalf of their
subjects, the latter were (are) encouraged to practice self-reliance either
individually, or more often, collectively through the extended family. The
ubiquity of land use rights, as opposed to private property rights, in
much of Africa must be seen as a compromise between the communitarian
ideal of land as a sacred trust to which members of the community must
have access and the more individualistic ideal of responsibility and self-
reliance, which particularly in pastoral cultures were deemed necessary
for males to marry. Traditional Africa had a wonderful capacity to craft
hybrid institutions that rewarded individual talent and efforts and main-
tained communal interest and control.
For example, among the Peuls of northern Cameroon, a young man
had to have so many head of cattle before his parents would agree to
approach the family of the potential bride for a marriage proposal, this
while much of the grazing land was communally owned. To be sure,
marital status and biological reproduction were tied to personal achieve-
ment for males, but the individual remained firmly ensconced in the
community through the institution of the arranged marriage and com-
mon ownership of pasture. Simply put, a potential groom could display
industry through herd size, as this was a precondition for marriage, but
was not expected to go off entirely on his own to accumulate wealth and
(or) wives.
Even today and even in urban Africa, it is a rare African in whose
success the community (meaning here mostly the extended family) did
not participate and, consequently, is not expected to share. Any reform
of agriculture in Africa, if it is to succeed, cannot run roughshod over
this delicate balance between individualism and ‘communitarianism’. The
problem with land in much of Africa today (e.g. Ghana) is the fuzzy line
among different forms of ownership – state, community and individual
land – and the inconsistent enforcement of ownership rights (whatever
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they may be), which raises the price of land via higher transaction costs.
The solution to this brigandage is not privatization but more transpar-
ency in land ownership rights and greater willingness on the part of the
state to enforce the rules.
China shows that it is possible to improve agricultural performance
without overturning traditional land ownership patterns. It is always
puzzling to hear the same analysts who correctly point to institutional
mismatch as one of the sources of failure of collectivized agriculture in
the former Second World, yet in the same breath uncritically embrace
private property rights as the universal solution to improving agricul-
tural performance in the Third World. Incentives are not a monopoly of
the capitalist mode of production. Increasing farm output does not nec-
essarily mean privatizing farmland. Private ownership of land is but one
incentive to agricultural performance among many, and its ubiquity in
the so-called West is a product of a particular historical experience, which
cannot be assumed to have universal currency. China, once again, has
yet to make firm guarantees to Western-style private property rights,
but this ambiguity has not suffered economic performance. Other stimu-
lants of agricultural performance include: liberalization of restrictions
on farming surplus value, farmer access to credit and (or) intrants (e.g.
fertilizers and improved seeds) and farmer ability to transport goods to
market.
Along with the HRS the state encouraged the development of Town-
ship and Village Enterprises (TVEs), which were intended to break the
historical dichotomy between agriculture and industry, by fostering the
integration of these activities. This is reflected in the quintessentially
Chinese dictum: leaving the land but not the countryside, entering the
factory but not the city. TVEs were not invented by Chinese reformers;
they were adaptations to the commune and brigade enterprises created
during the Great Leap Forward, which were originally intended to ab-
sorb surplus labour in the rural areas. After 1978, agricultural reform in
China led to such a sharp rise in rural incomes that the output of the
TVE could be readily absorbed, thus creating a viable rural market for
both goods and labour and, just as importantly, synergy between agricul-
ture and industry. TVEs share these features: ‘they are publicly owned
but market oriented; they are small in size, enjoy a high degree of au-
tonomy of operations; they are much more outward-oriented than state-
owned enterprises (SOEs); they are subject to hard budget constraints’
(Fu and Balasubramanyam 2002).
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The last feature of the TVEs comes from the fact that such organiza-
tions receive very little support from the state-owned banks and can go
bankrupt if they are chronically unprofitable. This feature also solves
the principal-agent problem, inasmuch as TVE managers (agents) are
under pressure to perform, that is to say, to act as de facto owners cum
local governments (principals) would have acted if they had the manag-
ers’ alleged expertise. The agents cannot remain passive to firm per-
formance, since their salaries and bonuses depend on profitability, and
the principals cannot be indifferent, since profit sharing between the
TVEs and local governments is an important source of the latter’s rev-
enue. The size of TVEs also makes for shrinking span of control by local
government of management, thereby further reducing the agency prob-
lem. Finally, inasmuch as local governments act as interlocutors before
regional and centralized authorities, as well as help to secure financing,
labour and raw materials for TVEs, transaction costs are reduced, and,
as Douglass North (2005) points out, where transaction costs are zero,
the neoclassical assumption of optimal efficiency pertains.
The experience of China, where local governments own most TVEs,
shows that reforming countries do not have to privatize industrial assets
quickly, in order to achieve industrial efficiency and economic growth, in
the same way that the HRS demonstrates that the privatization of farm-
land is not a sine qua non for improving agricultural performance. Assets
can be transferred hierarchically, from one level of government to an-
other, rather than laterally, from government to the private sector. In
Africa in the 1980s, a major component of structural adjustment pro-
grams (SAPs) was the privatization of the state owned enterprises
(SOEs), which in the eyes of donors had been one of the causes of the
fiscal crisis of the African state, because their soft budget constraints
meant that they could rely on their national treasuries for bailouts, even
in the face of inefficiency and persistent financial losses. In retrospect,
there may have been at least an interim solution situated somewhere
between outright privatization and continued ownership of industrial
assets by centralized authority, namely: the devolution of SOEs to local
authority, especially those connected to agro-industrial processing, and
joint administration of these enterprises between hired agents and local
principals. Also, budget constraints can be hardened without privatization.
In China the TVE was successful in breaking the historical dichotomy
between agriculture and industry, by fostering the integration of these
activities. Agriculture and industrialization are not mutually exclusive.
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This has enormous implication for Africa, which processes little of its
raw materials into even the most basic of finished products. But what
cannot be overemphasized here was the willingness of China to use in-
stitutions that had legitimacy among the Chinese people in the pursuit
of economic development, rather to import wholesale others that may
well have been resisted, because of their unfamiliarity and external spon-
sorship. It will be further demonstrated in the discussion below that this
ability of the Chinese to jettison existing institutions is not limited to
one sector; it runs through all the other policy areas and constitutes the
essence of disjointed incrementalism.
There have been efforts in Africa to integrate agriculture and indus-
try. In general, they have not worked for several reasons. Firstly, these
initiatives entailed the creation of parastatals imposed by the central
state; local officials, much less local farmers, had little stake in their
success. In China’s TVE the reverse pertains. Secondly, agro-industrial
parastatals were often too large and had to confront the problem of
unreliable supply. Inputs were sometimes in short supply or low in qual-
ity, because of improper monitoring of farm production and poor trans-
portation. Thirdly, they operated under conditions of soft budget
constraints. The experience of Cameroon Tannery near Ngaoundéré
(Adamawa Province) in the 1980s was emblematic. Hide and skin needed
by the firm to make leather would often arrive with blood and other
residues of slaughtered animals; they were also mislabelled so that the
finished product would be of inferior quality, which damaged the reputa-
tion of the firm. But as long as Cameroon Tannery could depend on its
parent ministry (MINEPIA) and the central treasury (MINEFI), it had
no incentive to engage in quality control of its supplies. China’s TVEs,
as seen earlier, faced hard budget constraints; they are completely
decoupled from Beijing. The uncertainty occasioned by their independ-
ence provides a strong incentive to performance.
Finance
The financial system is the lubricant of any modern economy. When it
ceases to grease the wheels, the economy grinds to a halt. A good finan-
cial system does two things: mobilize capital (i.e. savings) and direct it
unto areas of high return on investment (ROI) and low risk. China’s
financial system is one of the best in the world at mobilizing resources.
On average Chinese citizens save 35 percent of their disposable income,
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most of which goes to bank deposits (checking accounts) and savings
accounts. A number of factors help to explain China’s high savings rate.
Government-backed postal savings accounts provide a safer place for
Chinese citizens to put their money than teapots. The yuan renminbi
(RNB) is not (yet) easily convertible, as the Chinese government limits
citizen access to foreign currencies. This makes it extraordinarily diffi-
cult for small savers to keep accounts in foreign banks, which until 2006
were excluded from the Chinese banking system, where four state-owned
banks intermediated 75 percent of all deposits. Until recently, bank de-
posits were the only option for Chinese savers, as opportunities for in-
vestment in the ‘irrational exuberance’ of stock ownership were foreclosed
by the state. Finally, as China has reduced poverty and increased the size
of its middle class, Chinese families simply have more disposable in-
come to save.
China uses its financial system to channel capital into preferred areas
of economic development, and the People’s Bank of China relies on
administrative control rather than market forces. Through the central
bank the Chinese state maintains overall control of monetary policy and
through the state-owned commercial banks it channels capital to spe-
cific industries, but regional and local officials can (and do) attract pri-
vate, even foreign, capital to their area. They do not have to rely on
financing from the institutions of the central state. In addition, thanks
in large part to money transfers from overseas Chinese, China has a
large informal lending market with estimated assets of 100 billion USD
(Farrell and Lund 2006). Smaller firms are able to find capital for in-
vestment in the informal sector, when they cannot acquire foreign capi-
tal through joint ventures or domestic capital from the state-owned banks.
Some TVEs also own banks and credit unions. These are further sources
of capital for small business.
In sum, the market for capital in China evinces diversity through de-
centralization, precisely the features of disjointed incrementalism pre-
vailing in other sectors of the economy. But the People’s Bank of China,
the central bank, continues to exert strong control over monetary policy
and financial institutions, again, further evidence of disjointed
incrementalism in action. Chinese monetary policy has been one of the
reasons behind the success of China in international trade. But China
did not officially embrace currency devaluation to stimulate export, the
usual elixir of neo-liberals. This may have enabled Chinese officials to
resist Western pressure to revalue the yuan in order to reduce China’s huge
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trade surplus. Rather, Chinese policy has been to keep the yuan stable
while building China’s already huge reserve account (over 1 trillion USD).
The pathologies of Africa’s financial system are one of the causes of
the continent’s underdevelopment. Officially, savings rates throughout
Africa are extremely low. As a result, banks lack capital to finance large
scale investments. But even moderate scale investments cannot find fi-
nancing. The environment in much of Africa is perceived as risky, there-
fore, banks levy high interest rates on loans and place cumbersome
requirements on borrowers, which force many small firms to seek fi-
nancing in the informal sector, forego expansion and (or) raise capital
internally (through savings).
Furthermore, bank lending in Africa tends to be of a political, rather
than commercial, character: politically connected ‘big men’ are lent money;
‘small boys’ are kicked to the sidewalk, or otherwise discouraged from
even knocking on the door. Viable business plans are not financed, be-
cause banks do not take even reasonable risks or they unfairly discrimi-
nate among borrowers. Finally, in parts of Africa (Francophone Africa)
central banks do not have autonomy in making monetary policy. In real-
ity, they are local and regional subsidiaries of foreign monetary authori-
ties (e.g. Bank of France). How can development take place under this
condition, when its engine (capital) has been effectively removed from
the control of Africans? The need for an African ‘big think’ (national-
ism) is no more glaring than in this area.
Fortunately, there are in Africa, as in China, institutions that can play
an important role in the financial sector. They are not necessarily state-
owned institutions, such as central banks; still, African governments can
influence how they work. In Ghana, traditional, pooled savings institu-
tions (essusus) number 5,000 and are estimated to hold 140 million USD
in total capital. The amount of periodic contributions to the common
pool in an essusu (or tontine in Cameroon) varies. In principle, therefore,
even the poorest Ghanaian can be a member of an essusu. Ghanaian banks,
on the other hand, require customers to maintain a monthly minimum
balance of 150,000 cedis in their account, or the equivalent of one-month
salary (Marrot, Barrohi and Ghabi 2007). It should not be too hard for
the reader to guess which savings institution ordinary Ghanaians prefer.
Insofar as they remain largely in the informal sector, essusus, tontines and
other institutions like them constitute a leakage out of the national sav-
ings stream, with deleterious consequences on investment. A relatively
easy step by government would be to enact policy that brings pooled
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savings institutions from under the shadow of informality. Encouraging
essusu and tontine managers to embrace sound methods of bookkeeping
and providing ordinary members legal titles to assets would increase
credit worthiness and facilitate access to capital from banks and finan-
cial institutions.
Remittances are playing an important role in developing countries. In
2005, they were twice the amount of official development aid (ODA) at
188 billion USD (Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh 2007). They are the second
largest source of foreign exchange earnings after gold in Ghana, and far
surpass foreign aid (all sources combined). In Senegal, remittance in-
flows from 2000 to 2005 represented, on average, 7 percent of GDP and
22 percent of export earnings (ibid). However, in spite of their increas-
ing importance, remittances in Africa suffer from the same deficiencies
as remittances from immigrants elsewhere, namely, they are used mainly
for consumption rather than investment and are not taxable. Yet, they
could be an important source of capital for many capital-starved countries.
One of the critical sources of capital for China, especially during the
early years of economic liberalization (1979-1989), was Hong Kong,
then a British colony. Taiwan alternated with Japan as the biggest inves-
tor in China during this period as well. Simply put, overseas Chinese
were not negligible in the success of China. The push of economic stag-
nation and population growth may have led to them to take physical
leave of the homeland, but the emotional pull of nationalism and famil-
ial obligations compelled them to keep their wallets open. In the age of
globalization, savings need not come from the citizens who live and work
inside the borders of the states that claim them. African states have
some distance to travel before they can ‘capture’ (perhaps a poor choice
of word) the savings of their internal citizens for development, much
less those living overseas. But the larger point is that there are in Africa
sources of capital that are yet to be mobilized for development, some of
which go back to the colonial period. The World Bank is expendable.
Indeed, World Bank capital constitutes a very small fraction of annual
capital flow, respectively 23 billion USD versus 647 billion USD in 2005.
Africa may never develop, if it counts on the World Bank as its financier.
The Bank played a very minimal role in China’s development.
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Industry and Direct Foreign Investment (DFI)
The development of an industrial sector in China was made possible in
part by the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), whose history
bears further testimony to incremental policy making. The State Coun-
cil of China, the highest executive body in the PRC, authorized the crea-
tion of the first SEZs in 1979 in the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian.
The choice was not entirely coincidental. These provinces were located
in China’s southeast coast, a geo-strategic area rich in labour resources
and a cosmopolitan culture, which shared linguistic and economic ties to
overseas Chinese business communities in Hong Kong, Taiwan and even
Singapore (Wei 1999). These provinces were China’s window to the
outside world in the late nineteenth century, but the Chinese state could
exercise control over the SEZs to a much greater extent than imperial
authority could influence the ‘Open Door Policy’.
In Guangdong the SEZs were located in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and
Shantou and in Fujian Province there was one SEZ in Xiamen. (For
those unfamiliar with China, the four zones were located either near
Hong Kong, Taiwan or Macao). The SEZs were not the usual free trade
zones thrust upon developing countries by donors in the name of liber-
alization; they were more than semi industrial enclaves where multina-
tional corporations received generous tax breaks in exchange for creating
a limited number of jobs with few fringe benefits, and with no visible
connection between their activities and the rest of the economy. Instead,
the goal of the SEZs was ‘to experiment with the development of an
outward looking, market oriented economic system, and to serve the
country as a “window” and a “base” along these lines ...The rest of the
domestic economy could be connected to the outside world through the
window, without leaving the door wide open’ (ibid).
 The SEZs were not created out of thin air. The Chinese government
incurred significant start-up costs to bring them about. The SEZs were
to be self-standing entities with their own sewer system, electrical power
grid, housing stock, health facilities, schools and of course factories and
storage facilities. In addition, the Chinese state issued a set of policies
and regulations governing the operations of the SEZs that no doubt
facilitated their success. China, in a limited way, reformed its property
rights and contract laws, making them more transparent and predictable
to foreign investors. According to one scholar, ‘The regulations concerned
such matters as equity ratios of foreign investors, the length of contract
periods, employment and wages, land use, corporate and individual in-
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come taxes, business regulation, entry and exit procedures, foreign ex-
change transactions, technology transfers, patent rights, and visa appli-
cations’ (ibid). China did not simply designate parts of its territory as
SEZs and blindly invite foreign investors to come in. It set conditions
aimed at benefiting China as much as international capital.
At least two lessons stand out from China’s experience with the SEZs.
Firstly, the SEZs were adaptations to existing institutions. All of the
first-generation SEZs were located in parts of China that had long been
integrated into the world economy. Once again, the role played by over-
seas Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan cannot be underestimated. China
did not decline capital from Taiwan because of political differences with
the island’s leaders. Thus, in the mid-1990s Hong Kong and Taiwan
were, respectively, the two biggest investors in China, ahead of the United
States (Sun and Tipton 1998). Secondly, China’s SEZs demonstrate
that comparative advantage is dynamic rather than static; but, more im-
portantly, in the modern world system comparative advantage is manu-
factured by states rather than bestowed by nature. China had been the
world’s most populous country for centuries, but its bountiful supply of
cheap labour did not suffice to attract foreign capital before 1978. The
clincher was a series of policy decisions by the state, from limited reform
of property rights to investment in fixed and human capital to decen-
tralization that gave foreign capitalists the confidence that China was
worth the risk.
China’s experience with SEZs calls attention to the need for states to
enact policies that actively promote direct foreign investment while in-
suring that it benefits the whole economy, not just enclaves thereof. China
also demonstrates that it is unwise to inject state capital into industrial
ventures indefinitely, lest this creates soft budget constraints. SEZs were
supported by the state only in their infancy; they were expected to be
self-sustaining soon thereafter. In other words, their budget constraints
were hardened as soon as they started production. There have been at-
tempts in Africa to create the institutional equivalents of SEZs and,
more generally, attract direct foreign investment. Their failure is instruc-
tive and highlights the differences with China.
Firstly, these attempts, such as the former East African Community
(EAC), did not bear fruit because of rivalry among African governments
(socialist Tanzania versus capitalist Kenya). Secondly, they relied far
too extensively on foreign capital for African industrialization. As a re-
sult, foreign capital often engaged in a kind of striptease, pitting one
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solicitous African country against another, which no doubt exacerbated
the first problem. Thirdly, inadequate infrastructure has impeded direct
foreign investment in Africa, as have government inconsistencies in fis-
cal, monetary and investment policy, which create uncertainty among
investors. Fourthly, and perhaps more importantly, industrial and free
trade zones in Africa have tended to result in the creation of enclaves
with little forward and backward linkage industries and, therefore, no
serious connection to the rest of the economy. They have not been vec-
tors of genuine technology transfer. Rather, they have been heavens for
capital in search of cheap labour, raw materials and tax exemption.
China’s experience with SEZs compels rethinking of the forces that
may exist in Africa and the Diaspora that may facilitate capital penetra-
tion of the continent. Capital from overseas Africans, including African-
Americans, could play a role in the development of the continent.
Furthermore, certain groups in Africa known for their entrepreneurial
spirit and extensive social networks (réseaux) may be of use in integrat-
ing the African continent in the grid of globalization. Because of their
‘otherness’, these groups have generally been considered suspect by Af-
rican state elites, if not to say ordinary Africans (e.g. Lebanese and Syr-
ians in West Africa, Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa). In turn, they
may not have invested as much in the continent as they could have,
which reinforces suspicion. Political uncertainty and popular envy al-
ways breed conservativeness in business practices by visible minorities.
It may not be entirely coincidental that Uganda’s economic performance
improved in the wake of a more accommodating stance vis-à-vis entre-
preneurs of Asian origin by President Yoweri Museveni.
Chinese Lessons, African Hope
There is nothing mystical about Chinese economic performance. In fact,
many of China’s reforms had antecedents elsewhere in Asia and well
beyond. The enabling conditions for economic development are fairly
well understood by now. They include an ability to produce food, which
makes for a healthy population and ‘primitive’ capital accumulation; a
working financial system, to mobilize savings and channel it to produc-
tive use, and stable monetary policy; an industrial sector that transforms
raw materials into finished products that people want to buy; invest-
ment in human and fixed capital; controlled interaction with the outside
world; and, above all, a working state that can facilitate the attainment
of the aforementioned conditions, craft and enforce property rights that
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are consonant with societal values, provide social services, maintain in-
ternal order and protect its border from external predators. This is a way
of refuting ahistorical, culture-based and metaphysical explanations of
Chinese economic success, and embracing agency in economic develop-
ment. It is also an affirmation that Africa’s challenges are not immuta-
ble; they, too, can be overcome by human action. Future generations
may regard the continent’s alleged neopatrimonialism, social capital defi-
cit, bad geography and other expressions of Afro-pessimism with the
same curiosity as the dour prognosis heaped upon Asia by Western think-
ers (among them Karl Marx) for its ‘despotism’.
The universality of the state as the dominant mode of socio-political
organization entails that, for the foreseeable future, it is likely to remain
the primary source of human agency in development. The fact is, in the
modern age there has not been a single country that was poor and be-
came rich without a state. Political order is a predicate for development
and survival. ‘Without order, there is no future’ (Bates 2007). There-
fore, economic development is essentially a state project. Globalization
does not exclude the need for states but rather amplifies it. A market
system does not vitiate the need for a state. On the contrary, inasmuch
as competitive market economy entails a complex property rights sys-
tem, this makes a working state all the more indispensable, in order to
reduce transaction costs, which, in turn, facilitates efficiency. The ben-
efits of the Chinese model, as compared to that of the neo-liberal model,
are precisely that the former combines state and market, rather than
chooses one over the other.
However, having a state does not guarantee development any more
than having a market insures prosperity. The states that have succeeded
in achieving development have been precisely those whose leaders have
understood the connection between state making, prosperity and their
own survival and have been willing to make the requisite decisions to
achieve all three within an overarching discursive paradigm of national-
ism. This is referred to as ‘big think’ in this article which shows how it
has operated in the Chinese context. At the same time, to acknowledge
that economic development has been (is) far too complex and impor-
tant a matter to be left to the hazards of chance rather than the capable
hands of human agency is not to suggest that there is one road to pros-
perity and only states have the map. The history of development is re-
plete with well-meaning state plans that went awry with disastrous
consequences, not least in China (Scott 1998). The centrality of the
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state does not justify turning it into an object of idolatry, for, as the
experience of China suggests, there is no magic wand in development,
‘no do-it-yourself growth kits that one can simply borrow from others
and apply’. (Mkandawire 2005)
Instead, development presents problems of the type that the late pro-
fessor Martin Landau might have called ‘wicked’, that is to say, prob-
lems that engender concord in regards to ends but discord in regards to
means (Landau 1986). In such cases, decision makers, Landau always
counselled, should experiment, proceed with caution, respect social in-
stitutions that have withstood the test of time, and engage in trial and
error. More importantly, they should create mechanisms for error detec-
tion and correction, a key element of which is ‘redundancy’, which local-
izes mistakes (Landau 1969). This approach to policy is referred to as
disjointed incrementalism, in order to underscore its decentralized, ex-
perimental, and therefore tentative, character. But policy never takes
place in a political vacuum. In the case of China, the political ideology of
‘big think’ (or nationalism) has largely informed the policy of disjointed
incrementalism.
It is doubtful that without the vision provided by Mao Zedong of a
strong, united, independent and self-reliant – in short, an erect – China,
economic development could have been achieved. It is equally doubtful
that without fragmentation of decisions and implementation – in sum,
policy experimentation – China could have succeeded. China is simply
too complex for the synoptic solutions embedded in previous reform
efforts (e.g. Great Leap Forward) to have been successful. In the end,
the main lesson provided by China to Africa may be this: make states
that captivate the imagination of citizens and gain their support through
a nationalist project, but have state leaders who, cognizant of their
bounded rationality, are willing to pursue development resolutely but
cautiously. What kind of state is likely to capture the imagination of
Africans and gain their support?
Toward a Plausible African ‘Big Think’
Because of the trauma wrought by the triple experience with the slave
trade, colonialism and post-colonialism, and the yearning that all three
naturally create for unity, Pan-Africanism is still the most potent, cred-
ible, political ideology among the masses in Africa today. It could, and
probably must, be Africa’s ‘big think’, if Africa has any realistic chance
of being the world economy’s next success story. In other words, Pan-
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Africanism should be the organizing principle or ideology of a new Afri-
can statecraft to replace the partitioning schemes of King Leopold II,
Otto von Bismarck and other scramblers. An ideology, of course, ‘is an
economizing device by which individuals come to terms with their envi-
ronment and are provided with a ‘world view’ so that the decision mak-
ing process is simplified’ (North 1981).
Thus, ideologies are like theories: they rationalize and explain a given
situation, while providing possible alternatives that are adduced to be
better than the status quo. An ideology therefore is always at least a
latent call for action. What the African state, as it is currently consti-
tuted, lacks then is a credible ideology capable of explaining Africa’s
political balkanization, that is, its 50-odd states in light of potential
mass support for considerably fewer, its underdevelopment in the midst
of the bountiful natural resources bestowed by the gods (yes, the gods),
its marginalization in the concert of nation-states in spite of a Diaspora
that is truly global in character and relatively prosperous. Worse still,
the modern African state, too Lilliputian in many places to be recogniz-
able even on an African map, is not capable of providing strategies, or
devising plans, that would liberate the continent’s arrested development.
Enter Pan-Africanism, the case for which is basically three-fold.
Firstly, ‘ “Africa” is probably the most emotionally evoked name of
any continent. Its people sing about it, paint it, sculpt it more than any
other continent. Its artists produce hundred of icons of this much “be-
loved continent”. Even national anthems often evoke Africa much more
than individual country names’ (Mkandawire 2004). In other words,
‘Africa’ has a greater hold on the collective imagination than any other
concept. It would be far easier to rally Africans around ‘Africa’ than any
other social project, in the same way that Mao Zedong rallied the Chi-
nese around ‘China First.’
Secondly, de facto Pan-Africanism exists throughout the continent. It
is to be found in the existence of formal and informal institutions – e.g.
chieftaincies, secret societies, trade networks, land property rights, lan-
guage families, religions, etc. – that cut through large swaths of the con-
tinent. In this connection, ordinary Africans are well ahead of their rulers,
whose indifference, if not to say hostility, to the Pan-African project has
been deleterious to its progress. The main obstacle to development in
Africa may well be how to align the interests of territorially bound rulers
with the transcendent institutions of citizens, who are more likely to
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support development efforts if they are consonant with existing prac-
tices and values.
Thirdly, Pan-Africanism is firmly in line with trends in the world geo-
political economy, whose logic calls for large and transnational entities.
These are legion: multinational corporations (GM and Wal-Mart), free
trade blocs (NAFTA), confederations (EU), international financial in-
stitutions (World Bank, IMF), regulatory organizations (WTO), terror-
ist outfits (al-Qaeda), criminal syndicates (the Russian Mafia in Moscow,
London and Brighton Beach, New York City), etc. In the age of globali-
zation, bigger may not always be better (as the experience of Daimler-
Chrysler demonstrates), however, it often provides greater insurance for
survival in a turbulent environment.
The concrete benefits of Pan-Africanism have long been identified
but they are worth summarizing. Pan-Africanism would allow Africa to
take advantage of the economies of scale that accrue with larger markets
(Green and Seidman 1967). It would allow Africa to better leverage its
natural resources, some of which can only be found on the continent, in
the same way that China has leveraged its population to attract capital.
It would facilitate the connection of landlocked territories to the world
economy and raise them up from poverty. Concomitantly, it would allow
for easier sharing of resources between rich and poor communities, for
the same reason that Germans have been willing, in effect, to transfer
resources to Poles and Irishmen: ‘Europe’. It would give the continent
greater clout in the world economic order and on the tribune of interna-
tional opinion (the UN), as it would be able to speak with one voice
rather than many (Mandaza 2002). It would reduce interstate wars, in
the same way that the EU has kept the peace among Europe’s historical
warring factions. It would reduce intra and interstate conflicts, by
delocalizing identity (How many lives have been lost in Ivory Coast
because of Ivoirité, which may have begun as little more than a cynical
ploy by some Ivorian politicians to rally their electoral base but turned
out to have deadly consequences?). It would increase democracy, as lo-
cal scoundrels would no longer be able to take refuge in raison d’état
and sovereignty. In sum, Pan-Africanism would facilitate development,
by removing what may well be the main barrier to prosperity in the Afri-
can context: the tension between the territorially bound, mostly debile,
predatory African state and the transcendent and vibrant institutions of
African civil society, which are also consonant with globalization. The
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criticisms of Pan-Africanism have been heard before. They are refuted
one-by-one here.
Pan-Africanism is not a pipe dream that is simply too complex to be
implemented. It is seldom recalled today that the European Union, one
of the most successful ‘big think’ products of our time, began modestly
as a customs union of coal and steel among 6 countries of northern
Europe, which more than 50 years later has its own currency, 27 member
states, a parliament and perhaps soon a constitution. Nor is it remem-
bered that before 1949, China was a virtual doormat of imperialist pow-
ers. All this began to change with one simple but solemn declaration in
September of that year and China has never looked back (i.e. ‘The Chi-
nese people have stood up’). But Pan Africanism does not gainsay ex-
perimental policy making (disjointed incrementalism), beginning perhaps
with economic institutions operating, at first, at regional levels. For ex-
ample, South Africa’s Rand could be the medium of exchange for the
southern Africa region. China’s SEZs, HRS and TVEs began as modest
experiments in a larger framework of modernization.
Pan-Africanism does not immediately necessitate continental govern-
ment, although in the long run this may well be the outcome. But even
then such a government would almost certainly be the result of pains-
taking negotiations among local stakeholders. Therefore, it would likely
be a federation or confederation, leaving significant powers to non-cen-
tral authorities. Because many African states have undergone a demo-
cratic transition since 1990, such a (con)federation would also likely
consist of democratic states. Pan-Africanism is not African Big Brother
coming to consume its junior siblings. But there would have to be cer-
tain markers or, as the British like to say: red lines. These are fundamen-
tal principles upon which action aimed at achieving Pan-Africanism would
be built, rather than principles Pan-Africanism would seek to avoid in
the interest of amity and political correctness. One of these markers
would be the integration of geo-political space, which would of course
calls into question the secular sanctity of the borders drawn at the Berlin
Conference, the proverbial elephant in the room at Casa Blanca and in
Addis Ababa in 1961. Another is social inclusiveness.
Pan-Africanism cannot succeed unless it directly and concretely ben-
efits ordinary Africans, in the same way that President Hu Jintao’s re-
cently enshrined concept of ‘scientific development’ is aimed at extending
the benefits of economic growth to even more Chinese citizens while
cleaning up the environment. Thus, Pan-Africanism should not be con-
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ceived as some grand political project, whose utility to the African masses
is largely emotive or symbolic. Fundamentally, then, Pan-Africanism
would be a social project. It would put socialism ‘back in’ on the African
agenda, in counter-distinction to donor-imposed efforts to integrate Af-
rica in the global capitalist order as a primary commodity producer – still.
Pan-Africanism is the highest expression of African nationalism and
clearly incompatible with the arbitrary borders that zigzag the African
landscape, but it is not black racism. This would presuppose the strict
equation of Africa with the black ‘race’, and no such infantile presump-
tion is made here. As quite possibly the birthplace of humankind and
the literal centre of planet Earth, Africa has always been a meeting point
for all groups, the preponderance of the black epidermis in much of the
continent having more to do with geography and nature’s adaptation to
disease threats than any propensity of Africans toward exclusivity. Rac-
ist, in fact, is the belief that Africans cannot undertake collective action
to solve their own problems, and, therefore, will always need outsiders.
Pan-Africanism does not negate developmental states, on the con-
trary, it strengthens them through consolidation. One reason why devel-
opmental states in Africa would have a difficult time pursuing development
on their own would be the expected pressure they would experience to
open up their economies, in particular by the World Trade Organization
and the United States. The Asian developmental states (Japan, South
Korea) were either spared the unpleasantness of neo-liberal orthodoxy –
– because of the special circumstances of the Cold War – or could resist
it by their sheer weight in the world geo-political system (China).
No preferential treatment would likely be granted individual African
developmental states, as the imposition of structural adjustment pro-
grams in the 1980s made clear. Simply put: individual African develop-
mental states would have to sink or swim without life vests;
Pan-Africanism, by amalgamating states into large blocs (and, why not,
eventually into one), would enable them to better negotiate the treach-
erous currents. Furthermore, many countries in Africa have similar eco-
nomic profiles as primary commodity producers. Untrammelled
competition for capital could have effects akin to the behaviour of crabs
in a basket, whereby those at the bottom trample on their neighbours to
reach the top, only to be thrown overboard. As seen earlier, this was one
of the problems with the old EAC. Because of division, African coun-
tries are reduced to being the political equivalents of stage performers in
a burlesque show in a second-hand theatre where the rewards are mini-
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mal in the end. Pan-Africanism would insure rationality and coordina-
tion in African developmental efforts. In sum, there may be no African
future without the Pan-African developmental state.
Pan-Africanism has not really been tried in Africa in the post-colonial
period, therefore, it cannot be said to have failed. Pan-African projects,
from continent-wide efforts such as the OAU to regional initiatives such
as, once again, the EAC, never received the strong and consistent sup-
port from African rulers that would have been necessary for their suc-
cess. The leaders of these organizations never transcended parochial
interests for the sake of collective wellbeing. Their adhesion to Pan-
Africanism did not extend beyond the pageantry of the annual meet-
ings, that is, if they showed up at all. Finally, post-colonial, so-called
Pan-African efforts were all predicated on the acceptance of the imposed
artificialities of the Berlin Conference, the very anti-theses of African
development and Pan-Africanism itself.
Of course, there is no absolute guarantee that things would be better
this time around, but perhaps Pan-Africanism could avoid the ignominy
of its putative antecedent, given the ongoing democratization of the con-
tinent, which should facilitate the peaceful retirement of reactionaries,
and the ubiquity of similar efforts elsewhere, which may have awaken
Africans out of their stupor. In this connection, the decision to create a
(Pan)-African parliament, à la European parliament, may be more than
symbolic. For the first time in post-colonial Africa, the African masses
would have an institution they can directly affect across borders. For
Pan-Africanists, the task is clear under this dispensation: elect to the
(Pan)-African parliament, whenever it becomes operational, committed
Pan-Africanists, who would then use the institution as a launching pad
to deepen Pan-Africanism in their ‘home’ country and continent-wide.
Obviously, Pan-Africanism would not be easy. There would be enor-
mous problems integrating countries that are differentially endowed in
natural and human resources, do not share the same geography, culture
and so on. Yet, in spite of its unquestionable diversity, there is probably
more that unites Africa than divides it. There would also be external
resistance by imperialist powers that continue to regard large swaths of
the continent as their exclusive chasse gardée (prey). Overall, the difficul-
ties that Pan-Africanism can be expected to encounter by no means make
its realization impossible, only marginally more difficult if there is strong
leadership commitment. Besides, we are not suggesting that Pan-
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Africanism can be built in the course of one generation; it would be une
marche à longue haleine, a marathon that could take decades to complete.
In some ways, Africa is today where China was before 1949: weak
and wracked by division and ‘warlordism’. Just as it took a social revolu-
tion to unite and bring order to China under the authority of one state,
the same may well be necessary in some African countries whose disin-
tegration is probably past the point of ordinary reform (e.g. Nigeria and
Congo). No matter the human costs of this possible denouement, those
connected to continued misery and marginalization are probably much
higher. But one last time, as the example of China shows, the price of
development is state activism, big and disjointed, not immobility, sup-
plication and unshaken belief in the power of the market.
Notes
1. A developmental state may be defined as a state that uses its authority to
intervene significantly in the economy, in order to promote substantive goals,
such as export competitiveness, industrialization and food self-sufficiency.
More broadly, a developmental state is actively engaged not only in the
traditional areas of statecraft, i.e. security and stability, but also in prosperity.
2. An administrative system that grants local officials substantial autonomy in
implementing policy, by default, also grants them substantial ability in making
policy. At the same time, inasmuch as centralized authority maintains
penultimate power over local officials, as reflected in the carrying out of
capital punishment against corrupt local apparachiks in China, the central
state remains the formal/legal epicenter of policy making, even though, in
practice, the latter may be surreptitiously appropriated by subalterns. This
‘problem’ is not unique to China. The general currently in charge of U.S.
troops in Iraq, David Patraeus, is effectively making war policy as much as
he is implementing it.
3. China may have been so blinded by illusion of its grandeur that it may have
ultimately handed its occupiers the key to its own defeat. By failing to
modernize China, based in part on the belief that China was already modern,
the late Ming dynasty was in no position to resist foreign encroachment.
The inability was further aggravated by nasty palace intrigues, which kept
Chinese rulers isolated from their own retainers.
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